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Abstract:  Although theoretical models make distinct predictions about the relation between 
finance and income inequality, little empirical research has been conducted to compare their 
relative explanatory power.  We examine the relation between financial intermediary 
development and income inequality in a panel data set of 91 countries for the period of 1960-95. 
Our results provide reasonably strong evidence that inequality decreases as economies develop 
their financial intermediaries, consistent with Galor and Zeira (1993) and Banerjee and Newman 
(1993). Moreover, consistent with the insight of Kuznets, the relation between the Gini 
coefficient and financial intermediary development depends on the sectoral structure of the 
economy: a larger modern sector is associated with a smaller drop in the Gini coefficient for the 
same level of financial intermediary development. However, there is no evidence of an inverted-
U shaped relation between financial sector development and income inequality, as suggested by 
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990).  The results are robust to controlling for biases introduced by 
simultaneity. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Economists have been concerned about the distribution of income for a long time.   
Kuznets (1955), which is perhaps the seminal study on the distribution of income, argued that 
economic development is associated first with an increase and then a decrease in income 
inequality, resulting in an inverted u-shaped relationship between the two variables.  In the 
1990s, economists started to consider the link between financial sector development and income 
inequality.  Building on the Kuznets’ hypothesis, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) show how 
the interaction of financial and economic development can give rise to an inverted u-shaped 
relationship between income inequality and financial intermediary development.  Other models, 
however, have shown that financial market imperfections can perpetuate the initial distribution 
of wealth in the presence of indivisible investments (Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Galor and 
Zeira, 1993), suggesting a negative relationship between the two.  While the recent empirical 
literature has established a positive impact of financial development on economic growth, less is 
known about the empirical link between finance and income distribution.
1   
This paper analyzes the relationship between income distribution and financial 
intermediary development using panel data from both developing and developed countries 
between 1960 and 1995, Specifically, we analyze whether financial intermediary development 
has an impact on income inequality and whether this impact depends on the level of financial 
intermediary development or the sectoral structure of the economy, as implied by alternative 
                                                 
1  For the relationship between financial development and growth see, among others, Beck et al. (2000b), Levine et 
al. (2000) and Rousseau and Wachtel (2000).  In addition, see  Li et al. (1998), and Li et al. (2000) for the 
relationship between income inequality and financial sector development.  None of these papers aims to test for the  2
existing theories.  We allow for a non-linear relationship between financial sector development 
and income inequality.  Since causation could run either from financial sector development to 
inequality or from initial inequality to financial sector development, we attempt to allow for 
endogeneity using instruments for financial sector development suggested in the financial sector 
development-growth literature (see, for example, Levine, 1997b, 1999). 
The empirical investigation yields several results.  First, on average there appears to be a 
negative relationship between financial sector development and income inequality.  This is 
consistent with the conjecture in Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Galor and Zeira (1993).  
Second, we find little evidence to support the Greenwood-Jovanovic hypothesis of an inverted u-
shaped relationship between inequality and finance.   Third, consistent with insights based on 
Kuznets (1955), sectoral structure appears to affect how financial intermediaries impact 
inequality.  In particular, the inequality-reducing effects of financial intermediaries is muted in 
countries with larger modern (i.e., non-agricultural) sectors. 
The relationship between financial development and income distribution is important for 
policy makers.  While recent work has established a robust link between financial sector 
development and economic growth, policy makers are also interested in the distribution of the 
benefits of accelerated growth.  Moreover, given concerns about income distribution per se, a 
policymaker faced with certain policy options may wish to know how policies affect both growth 
and income distribution.  Finally, it is important for policy makers to know whether finance can 
be used as an instrument to affect income inequality and in what context it might be useful in 
doing so. 
                                                                                                                                                             
distinct implications of alternative existing theories regarding income distribution and financial sector development,  3
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We review the theoretical literature 
on the relationship between income inequality and financial sector development in section 2 and 
discuss the data that we use to test the theoretical hypotheses in section 3. After discussing the 
empirical model specification and some estimation issues in section 4, we present empirical 
results in section 5 and conclude in section 6.  
II.  THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON FINANCE AND INEQUALITY 
Several recent models suggest that capital market imperfections might affect income 
inequality during economic development.  For example, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) 
present a theoretical model in which financial development fosters economic development, 
which, in turn, facilitates necessary investment in financial infrastructure.   In their model, agents 
operate the more profitable, but more risky, of two technologies only when they can diversify 
risk by investing in financial intermediary coalitions.  However, the fixed costs (e.g., 
membership fees) associated with these coalitions prevent low-income individuals from joining 
them.  Assuming that poor individuals save less, and thus accumulate wealth more slowly, 
income differences between (high-income) members of intermediary coalitions and (low-
income) outsiders will widen, resulting in an increase in income inequality.  However, since the 
entrance fee is fixed, all agents eventually join these coalitions, resulting in an eventual reversal 
in the upward trend.  Consequently, Greenwood and Jovanovic’s (1990) model predicts an 
inverted u-shaped relationship between income inequality and financial sector development, with 
income inequality first increasing and then decreasing – before eventually stabilizing – as more 
people join financial coalitions (the inverted u-shaped hypothesis). 
                                                                                                                                                             
as intended by this paper.   4
Contrary to Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Galor 
and Zeira (1993) suggest that long-run convergence in the income levels of rich and poor will not 
necessarily happen in economies with capital market imperfections and indivisibilities in 
investment in human or physical capital. Depending on the initial wealth distribution, income 
inequality might persist.  Galor and Zeira (1993) construct a two-sector model with bequests 
between generations, where agents who make an indivisible investment in human capital can 
work in a skill-intensive sector.  However, given capital market imperfections, only individuals 
with bequests larger than the investment amount or who can borrow will be able to make this 
investment.  This results in income inequality that is perpetuated through bequests to the next 
generation.  In their model, an economy with capital market imperfections and an initially 
unequal distribution of wealth will maintain this inequality and grow more slowly than a similar 
economy with a more equitable initial distribution of wealth.  Similarly, Banerjee and Newman 
(1993) construct a three-sector model, in which two of the technologies require indivisible 
investment.  Due to capital market imperfections, only rich agents can borrow enough to run 
these indivisible, higher-return technologies. Once again, the initial distribution of wealth has 
long-run effects on income distribution and growth.  Holding all else equal, these models suggest 
that countries with larger capital market imperfections (i.e. higher hurdles to borrow funds to 
finance indivisible investment) should have higher income inequality.  Consequently, we should 
observe a negative relationship between financial development and income inequality (the linear 
hypothesis). 
The predictions of these models can also be combined with the insights of Kuznets 
(1955) to suggest potential links between the sectoral structure of the economy, financial sector 
development, and income inequality.  Focusing on the transition from agriculture to industry,  5
Kuznets (1955) conjectured that there might be an inverted u-shaped relationship between 
income inequality and economic development. As people move from the low-income, but more 
egalitarian, agricultural sector to the high-income, but less egalitarian, industrial sector, income 
inequality initially increases.  However, as the agricultural sector shrinks and agricultural wages 
increase, this trend reverses and income inequality decreases.
2   More general models involving a 
traditional sector with a simple technology and a modern sector that employs an advanced 
technology that requires familiarization and possibly re-education before adoption can make 
similar predictions (Aghion and Howitt, 1998; Helpman, 1998).  Since only a minority of people 
initially benefit from the higher income possibilities in the modern sector, income inequality 
increases at the initial stage of economic development.  However, as more people adopt the new 
technology, and as new entrants catch up with those who started earlier, this reverses and income 
inequality starts to fall.   
Financial sector development might affect income inequality if agents require access to 
finance in order to migrate to the modern sector.  Since, as suggested by Kuznets (1955), income 
inequality is likely to be higher in the modern sector (industry and services), and if entry into this 
sector is made easier when it is easier to gain access to finance, inequality will be greater in 
economies with larger modern sectors.  Further, if highly talented individuals can garner larger 
rewards in the modern sector, these individuals might be able to gain especially large rewards 
when they have easier access to finance, resulting in greater within-sector income inequality in 
the modern sector than would have been possible in the traditional sector.  Consequently, 
inequality will be higher in countries with large modern sectors and greater financial depth than 
                                                 
2 See also the analysis by Lewis (1954) and Todaro (1969) who formally model the idea.  6
in countries with only one (or neither) of these characteristics.  In other words, holding constant 
the direct impact of financial sector development on inequality, the coefficient on an interaction 
term between financial depth and the size of the modern sector would be positive.  We thus 
arrive at the augmented Kuznets hypothesis:  sector structure will affect how financial depth 
impacts inequality.  In particular, we expect a positive interaction between financial depth and 
the importance of the modern sector (as characterized by industry and service sectors). 
Theory thus makes different predictions about the relation between financial 
intermediaries and income inequality.  In the following, we use data from a broad cross-section 
of countries between 1960 and 1995 to assess the empirical validity of the different hypotheses. 
III.  DATA 
This section describes our indicators and data for financial intermediary development and 
income inequality as well as the set of conditioning information.  Table 1 presents descriptive 
statistics and correlations.
3  The income inequality data are based on a new data set of Gini 
coefficients compiled by Deininger and Squire (1996) and extended by Lundberg and Squire 
(2000). While the original data set contained over 2,600 observations, Deininger and Squire 
(1996) and Lundberg and Squire (2000) limited the data set by imposing several quality 
conditions. First, all observations had to be from national household surveys for expenditure or 
                                                 
3 The sample includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Germany, Denmark, Ecuador, 
Egypt, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Hong Kong (China), Indonesia, India, Ireland, Italy, 
Jordan, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Sri Lanka, Mexico, Malaysia, Nigeria, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Pakistan, 
Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United States of America, Venezuela, South 
Africa, Zimbabwe  7
income. Second, the coverage had to be representative of the national population. Third, all 
sources of income and uses of expenditure had to be accounted for, including own consumption.
4 
To explore whether there is an inverted U-shaped relation between economic 
development and income inequality, as proposed by Kuznets, we regress the logarithm of the 
Gini coefficient on the log of real per capita GDP and its square.  Figure 1 shows the result for 
the panel sample.  The graph suggests the existence of an inverted U-shaped curve.  However, 
this graph does not control for alternate explanations of income inequality, such as financial 
depth.  
The recent literature on the relationship between financial intermediary development and 
economic growth has developed several indicators to proxy for the ability of financial 
intermediaries to identify profitable projects, monitor and control managers, ease risk 
management and facilitate resource mobilization.  We concentrate on credit to the private sector 
by financial intermediaries over GDP (private credit).  This indicator, which comprises credits to 
private firms and households from banks and non-bank financial intermediaries (but which 
excludes central banks as lenders and government and state-owned enterprises as borrowers), 
seems a good proxy variable for the extent to which private sector agents have access to financial 
intermediation (as in Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990), or access to loans (as in Banerjee and 
Newman, 1993; Galor and Zeira, 1993).  Many recent studies have shown that growth is faster in 
countries where private credit is higher (see, for example, Beck et al., 2000b; Levine et al., 
2000).  To assess the robustness of our results, we also use an alternative measure of financial 
                                                 
4 To account for different sampling methods, we adjust the data using a method suggested by Deininger and Squire 
(1996), and also applied by Li et al. (1998) and Lundberg and Squire (2000).  Specifically, Deininger and Squire  8
intermediary development – claims on the non-financial domestic sector by deposit money banks 
divided by GDP (bank assets). In contrast to private credit, this measure excludes credits by non-
bank financial intermediaries but includes credits to governments and state-owned enterprises. 
Our sample shows a large variation in financial intermediary development.  Private credit 
ranges from 5% of GDP in Chile (1970-75) to over 200% in Japan (1990-95).  The two 
indicators of financial intermediary development are positively and significantly correlated (see 
Table 1).   The pairwise correlations indicate that income inequality is lower in countries with 
deeper financial markets; both indicators of financial sector development are significantly and 
negatively correlated with the Gini coefficient.  To visualize the relation between the Gini 
coefficient and financial intermediary development, Figure 2 plots the logarithm of the Gini 
coefficient and the fitted value from the regression of the logarithm of the Gini Coefficient on the 
logarithm of private credit against the logarithm of private credit. The plot in Figure 2 suggests a 
negative, and possible non-linear, relationship between financial sector development and income 
inequality.  
IV.  EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK  
To further explore the relationship between financial intermediary development and 
income inequality, we estimate the following regression.     
it it it CV Finance f ε α α + + + = 2 0 it ) ( ) Coef.   ln(Gini          (1) 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1996) find a systematic difference of 6.6 points between the means of income-based and expenditure-based Gini 
coefficients.  We therefore add 6.6 points to the expenditure-based Gini coefficients.    9
As discussed previously, bank assets or claims on the private sector by financial institutions 
(private credit) – both as a share of GDP – are the measures of financial sector development used 
in this study.   The focus of the analysis is f(Finance it) which, based upon the discussion of 
theoretical models linking income distribution to financial sector development, we assume has 
the following functional form:   
it it it it Modern Finance Finance Finance * 13
2
12 11 α α α + +  
Modern is value added in industry and services (i.e., non-agricultural) sectors over GDP.  The 
linear hypothesis predicts α11<0 and α12=0, but makes no predictions about α13. The inverted u-
shaped hypothesis predicts α11>0 and α12<0, but again makes no predictions about α13.  The 
augmented Kuznets hypothesis predicts α13>0.  
In addition to the financial sector variables, we include several variables to control for 
other factors that might affect inequality.   Specifically, we include linear and squared terms of 
the log of (initial) real per capita GDP to control for a direct “Kuznets-effect” of economic 
development on income inequality that is independent of any effect of financial intermediary 
development.  We also include the inflation rate conjecturing that monetary instability hurts the 
poor and the middle class relatively more than the rich, because the latter have better access to 
financial instruments that allow them to hedge their exposure to inflation.
5  We therefore expect 
inflation to have a positive coefficient. Finally, we include measures of government 
consumption, ethno-linguistic fractionalization and a measure of the protection of property rights 
(the risk of expropriation).  We might expect income inequality to be higher in countries where 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Easterly and Fischer (2001).   10
ethnic fractionalization is greater if, for example, people are averse to redistribution in countries 
where ethnic diversity is greater.
6  It is less clear whether government consumption and the 
property rights protection will increase or decrease income inequality.  For example, although 
the protection of property rights might protect the rich against expropriation by the poor, it could 
also have the opposite effect (i.e., protecting the poor against exploitation by the rich).  Similarly, 
if most redistribution through the tax and transfer system is towards low-income groups, 
government consumption might result in greater equality.  However, it could also have the 
opposite effect if rich households use their greater political power to exploit the poor.  Since 
Kuznets (1955) argues that income inequality depends on the sectoral structure of an economy, 
we include a variable representing the share of value-added accounted for by services and 
industry (as opposed to agriculture).  The correlation of the modern (i.e., non-agricultural sector) 
share of GDP and GDP per capita indicates that richer countries have smaller agricultural 
sectors. Although the simple correlation between the modern sector’s share of GDP and the Gini 
coefficient is negative, this appears to be because poorer countries have greater inequality and 
larger agricultural sectors.  After controlling for per capita income, the partial correlation 
becomes positive and significant. 
Following the convention of the vast majority of cross-country empirical studies, we split 
the sample period 1960-95 into seven non-overlapping 5-year periods.  We use 5-year periods 
rather than shorter time spans because while financial intermediary data are available on a yearly 
basis for most countries in our sample, they might be subject to business cycle fluctuations, 
which we can control for by averaging over longer time periods.  To take account of the panel 
                                                 
6 Consistent with this Alesina et al. (1999) find that spending on productive public goods (e.g., on schools) is lower 
in US cities where ethnic diversity is greater.  11
structure of the data, we considered using random or fixed effects estimators.  However, in this 
case it is not clear that fixed effects estimation would be appropriate.  The major problem is that 
the fixed-effects estimator, which focuses on within-country variation of financial development 
and income inequality, might seriously exacerbate problems related to measurement error 
(Griliches and Hausman, 1986). Since income inequality tends to change relatively slowly over 
time and is often poorly measured, it is likely that measurement error would be a significant 
problem in fixed-effects estimation.
7  We did, however, estimate the model allowing for random 
effects.  The results from this estimation were very similar in terms of size and statistical 
significance to the results from OLS.
8 
Estimating equation (1) with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) would introduce various 
biases since OLS does not allow for the possibility of reverse causality—that is, for the 
possibility that inequality affects the provision of financial services—something suggested in 
some of the theoretical models.  For example, in Greenwood and Jovanovic’s (1990) model, the 
initial distribution of wealth affects who is able to join financial intermediary coalitions and, 
therefore, might affect the size of the financial sector.  Since we are primarily interested in the 
effect of financial sector development on income inequality, we use an instrumental variables 
approach – adopting instruments for financial sector development similar to the ones used in 
Levine (1997b; 1999), which assesses the exogenous impact of financial intermediary 
development on economic growth.  The instruments are a set of dummy variables proposed by 
                                                 
7 Further, as noted by Easterly (2002), it is unclear whether standard panel methods are appropriate given that 
income distribution is relatively stable over time. 
8 Results are available from authors upon request.  12
La Porta et al. (1998) that identify the origin of the country’s legal system.
9  We use the legal 
origin dummy variables, rather than the measures of creditor rights, also proposed by La Porta et 
al. (1998), because they are available for a wider sample of countries.  Several papers have 
shown that differences in legal origins are significantly related to financial sector development, 
perhaps because different legal traditions put different levels of emphasis on the rights of 
property owners or because some systems are more adaptable to exogenous changes than 
others.
10  In the empirical analysis, we examine the validity of the instruments using Hansen’s J-
test to test the over-identifying restrictions.
11 
V.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
V.1  Main Results 
To test the linear hypothesis suggested by Galor and Zeira (1993) and Banerjee and 
Newman (1993), we regress the natural log of the Gini coefficient on linear terms for the two 
measures of financial sector development, private credit and bank assets, and the additional 
control variables.  Before we control for the possible endogeneity of the measures of financial 
sector development, the results are not consistent across the two measures (see column 1 of 
Table 2 for private credit and column 1 of Table 3 for bank assets).  The coefficient on private 
                                                 
9 The measures of legal origin were taken from the Global Development Network Growth Database produced by 
William Easterly and Mirvat Sewadeh (see Easterly, 2001).   
10 Beck et al., (2001) provide an excellent summary of much of the empirical and theoretical literature on this topic.  
La Porta et al. (1998) show that protection for corporate shareholders and creditors are strongest in common law 
countries and weakest in French Civil Law countries.  La Porta et al. (1997) relates these variables to some measures 
of capital market development (external market capitalization over GDP, number of listed firms per capita, initial 
public offerings), showing that they are generally lower in civil law (especially French Civil law) countries than in 
common law countries.  Beck et al. (2001) shows that private credit is lower in French Civil law countries than in 
German Civil law and Common law countries. 
11 In similar regressions of financial sector development on economic growth, Levine (1997b; 1999) fails to reject 
the null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are valid.    13
credit is statistically significant and positive when private credit is used as the measure of 
financial sector development, while the coefficient on bank assets is statistically significant but 
negative when bank assets is used as the measure of financial sector development.   
However, after controlling for endogeneity using the indicators of legal origin as 
instruments (see Section IV), the coefficients on both variables are negative and statistically 
significant, suggesting that financial sector development reduces income inequality.  We are 
unable to reject the null hypothesis that the legal origin dummies are uncorrelated with the error 
term after controlling for the other control variables, suggesting that they are appropriate 
instruments (see Hansen J-Stats in Table 2 and Table 3).  Based upon the coefficient estimates in 
column 1, a 1 percent increase in private credit or bank assets results in about a 0.25 percent 
decrease in the Gini coefficient. To test the inverted u-shaped hypothesis, we include a squared 
term for the measures of financial sector development (see column 5).  Since the coefficient on 
the squared term is never statistically significant in any model specification, the results fail to 
provide any support for this hypothesis. 
After controlling for endogeneity for the financial sector variables, many of the 
coefficients on the other control variables are statistically insignificant (see column 4 of Table 2 
and Table 3).  However, the coefficients on both the linear and squared terms for initial GDP per 
capita are statistically significant.  The positive coefficient on the linear term and the negative 
coefficient on the squared term suggest an inverted u-shape, with income inequality increasing 
with income at low levels of income and decreasing at high levels.  Based upon the coefficients 
in column 4 of Table 2, the turning point is at about $2350.  When private credit is used as the 
measure of financial sector development, the coefficient on government consumption is 
statistically significant and negative, suggesting that income inequality might be lower in  14
countries with higher government spending.  However, this final result is not robust to using 
bank assets as the measure of financial sector development (see Table 3). 
Finally, the results appear to provide some support for the Kuznets’ hypothesis that 
income inequality increases during the transition from agriculture to industry.  After controlling 
for other factors that might affect income inequality, including per capita income and financial 
sector development, the coefficient on the share of the economy accounted for by services and 
industry (i.e., sectors other than agriculture) is positive and statistically significant.  This 
suggests that income inequality is lower in countries where agriculture accounts for a greater 
share of GDP.   
To test the augmented Kuznets’ hypothesis that financial sector development might have 
a greater effect on income inequality in countries with smaller modern sectors, we include an 
interaction between value added in industry and services and the measures of financial sector 
development.  Consistent with this hypothesis, the coefficient on the interaction between finance 
and value-added in the modern (i.e., non-agricultural) sector of the economy is positive when 
either bank assets or private credit is used as the measure of financial sector development  (see 
column 6 in Table 2 and Table 3).  However, it is statistically significant only when private 
credit is used as the measure of financial sector development.  Based upon the point estimates of 
the coefficients in column 6 of Table 2, financial sector development reduces income inequality 
so long as the modern sector accounts for less that 99.6 percent of GDP – slightly lower that the 
maximum value observed in the sample.  At the sample mean for value added in the modern 
sector (87.4 percent of GDP – see Table 1), a 1 percent increase in private credit reduces 
inequality by 0.3 percent.  Similarly, based upon the point estimates, an increase in the size of 
the modern sector will increase inequality whenever private credit accounts for over 14 percent  15
of GDP – far below the sample mean but fractionally higher than the sample minimum (see 
Table 1).  In summary, financial sector development reduces inequality most in countries with 
relatively small ‘modern’ sectors, while increases in the size of the modern sector increase 
inequality most in countries with more developed financial markets.  Based upon the point 
estimates of the coefficients in Table 2, however, it is important to note that increases in financial 
depth will decrease inequality for almost all of the countries in the sample, while increases in the 
size of the modern sector will increase inequality for most of the countries in the sample.  
To summarize the empirical results, we find strong evidence to support the linear 
hypothesis that inequality is lower in countries with better-developed financial sectors.  Further, 
we also find some evidence that supports the augmented Kuznets hypothesis – inequality is 
generally higher in countries with smaller agricultural sectors (i.e., larger industrial and service 
sectors) and that this effect appears stronger in countries with more developed financial sectors. 
In contrast, we do not find any support for the inverted u-shaped hypothesis.  When squared 
terms for the indicators of financial sector development are included in the base specification, the 
coefficients on these terms are statistically insignificant.  
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
There has been little systematic empirical study on the relationship between finance and 
inequality.  This paper attempts to examine this issue by testing empirically distinct predictions 
made by alternative theories.  Specifically, Galor and Zeira (1993) and Banerjee and Newman 
(1993) predict a negative and linear relationship between finance and the Gini coefficient (the 
linear hypothesis), while Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) suggest an inverted U-shaped 
relationship (the inverted-U shaped hypothesis).  In addition, an important insight of Kuznets  16
(1955)—that the sectoral structure is important for the relation between economic development 
and income inequality—suggests that finance might reduce inequality to a lesser extent in 
countries with larger modern sectors (i.e., smaller agricultural sectors).  Exploring the link 
between indicators of financial intermediary development and the Gini coefficient in a large 
cross-country sample for the period 1960-95, we experiment with both simple specifications and 
more sophisticated specifications that control for simultaneity. Overall, our results provide 
reasonably strong support for the linear and somewhat more modest support for the augmented 
Kuznets hypotheses. We find a significant negative coefficient on the measures of financial 
intermediary development, while we find a positive interaction of finance with the size of the 
modern sector. The results are least consistent with the inverted-U shape hypothesis—the 
coefficient on the squared term for the financial intermediary indicators is never statistically 
significant and, in fact, often has the wrong sign.    
Overall, our results suggest that the growth-spurring effects of financial intermediary 
development are likely to be associated with positive effects on aggregate income distribution as 
well.
12 The dampening effect of financial intermediaries on income inequality, however, appears 
to depend upon the economic structure of the economy.   
We recognize some limitation of our results, which stem mostly from the limitations of 
our measure of income inequality.  Changes in the Gini coefficient can come about in different 
ways, by absolute and relative changes in one or several of the different income quintiles.   We 
do not explore the impact that a higher level of financial intermediary development has on the 
income level of a specific quintile, for instance the poor.  Moreover, even results obtained by  17
using quintile data have to be regarded with caution, since they do not control for migration 
between the quintiles over the sample period.  To analyze directly the effect of financial 
development on specific groups of the population, one would have to use disaggregated data, 
preferably at the household level.  This poses new challenges for future research.     
                                                                                                                                                             
12 See Levine (1997a) for a recent literature survey on this topic.  See also, Beck et al. (2001) for a discussion of 
more recent results.  18
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Figure 1: Log (Gini) and Log(GDP per capita) in a panel of 91 countries 
Note: The fitted line is from a regression of log(Gini) on the log of real per capita GDP and its square.   
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Figure 2: Log (Gini) against Log (Private Credit) in a panel of 91 countries 
Note: The fitted line is from a regression of log(Gini) on the log of Private Credit and its square.   
All data are averaged over seven 5-year periods between 1960 and 1995.  22
 























Number of Observations  170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 
Mean  37.147 51.367 46.184 6327.2 7.6646 0.2552  14.67871  0.1255 87.443 
Minimum  20.459 5.246  5.338  215.7 3.3000  0.0000  5.572046  0.0072  51.454 























Gini Coefficient  1.00          
           
Private Credit  -0.33  1.00         
  ( 0 . 0 0 )           
Bank Assets  -0.45  0.85  1.00        
  (0.00)  (0.00)         
Initial GDP per Capita  -0.58  0.70  0.62  1.00       
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)        
Risk of Expropriation  -0.52 0.64 0.65 0.80 1.00         
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)           
Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization  0.20 -0.36 -0.34 -0.46 -0.50 1.00       
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)         
Government Consumption  -0.46 0.28 0.29 0.62 0.49 -0.28 1.00     
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)       
Inflation Rate  0.44 -0.35 -0.37 -0.30 -0.31 -0.02 -0.25 1.00   
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.81) (0.00)     
Modern Sector Value Added/GDP  -0.25 0.58 0.57 0.71 0.73 -0.66 0.45 -0.06 1.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.45)   
Note.  Gini = measurement-adjusted Gini coefficient from Deininger and Squire (1996) and Lundberg and Squire (2000).  GDP per 
capita = real per capita GDP. Source: Loayza et al.  (1999).  Private Credit = claims on the private sector by financial institutions 
divided by GDP. Source: Beck et al. (2000a).  Bank Assets = claims on domestic non-financial sector by deposit money banks 
divided by GDP. Source: Beck et al. (2000a).  Risk of Expropriation = Index indicating risk of expropriation through confiscation or 
forced nationalization. Higher values indicate that risk is lower.  Source: International Country Risk Guide collected by the PRS 
Group.  Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization = Average value of five indices of ethno-linguistic fractionalization, with values ranging 
from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating greater fractionalization.  Source: Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000). Government 
Consumption = Government Consumption as share of GDP.  Source: World Bank (2002).  Inflation Rate = log difference of 
Consumer Price Index. Source: International Monetary Fund (2002).  Modern Sector Value Added/GDP = value added of service 
and industrial sectors as share of GDP. Source: World Bank (2002).  
 
drop correlation?  note the negative correlation between modern sector & gini. 
(alternatively, holding income level constant, the conditional correlation between Modern & Gini is positive.) 
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Table 2: Financial Intermediary Development and Income Inequality in a Panel: Private Credit 
  Ordinary Least Squares  Generalized Method of Moments 
Dependent Variable  Gini Coefficient (Natural Log) 
Number of Observations  170 170 170 170 170 170 
Number of Countries  44 44 44 44 44 44 
Financial Sector Development        
   Private Credit  0.0556**  -0.1723  -0.3536  -0.2362*** -0.0224 -1.4352** 
   (Natural Log, as share of GDP)  (2.04) (-1.13) (-1.50) (-3.19) (-0.01) (-2.23) 
   Squared Private Credit    0.0317      -0.0265   
   (Square of Natural Log, share of GDP)    (1.46)    (-0.09)  
   Modern Sector*Private Credit      0.0046*      0.0144** 
      (Interaction  Term)     (1.75)    (2.03) 
Initial GDP        
   Initial GDP per Capita  0.8242***  0.9656***  1.0736***  0.8076*** 0.6807 1.3866*** 
      (Natural  Log)  (4.18) (5.01) (4.69) (3.38) (0.54) (2.90) 
   Initial GDP per Capita Squared  -0.0578*** -0.0666*** -0.0740*** -0.0520*** -0.0444 -0.0913***
   (Square of Natural Log)  (-4.70)  (-5.49)  (-5.09)  (-3.47)  (-0.59)  (-3.02) 
Other Controls        
   Risk of Expropriation  -0.0285**  -0.0281**  -0.0308**  -0.0116  -0.0138  -0.0275** 
   (Index – higher values mean lower risk)  (-2.26)  (-2.24)  (-2.52)  (-0.76)  (-0.55)  (-2.15) 
   Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization  0.0919  0.0992  0.1078  0.1623  0.1558  0.2149** 
   (Higher values mean greater fractionalization)  (1.24)  (1.38)  (1.54)  (1.63)  (1.05)  (2.54) 
   Government Consumption  -0.1007**  -0.0815  -0.0696  -0.1596**  -0.1745  -0.0496 
   (Natural Log, Share of GDP)  (-2.15) (-1.62) (-1.41) (-2.32) (-1.19) (-0.68) 
   Inflation   0.2822***  0.2418** 0.2590*** -0.1275  -0.0603 -0.0114 
   (Natural Log)  (3.29)  (2.59)  (2.90)  (-0.74)  (-0.08)  (-0.08) 
   Modern Sector (Services and Industry)  0.0037  0.0027  -0.0108  0.0082**  0.0087  -0.0379 
   (Share of GDP)  (1.26)  (0.93)  (-1.17)  (2.02)  (1.27)  (-1.50) 
      Constant  0.6993 0.5804 0.9899 1.1797 1.2926  2.6746*** 
  (1.00) (0.88) (1.39) (1.30) (1.19) (3.36) 
R-Squared  0.57  0.57  0.58     
Hansen’s J-Test (Significance Level)      0.50  0.32  0.19 
 ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. 
The instruments for GMM specifications are dummies indicating legal origin.  The null hypothesis of the Hansen test is that the instruments are 
not correlated with the error terms. White (heteroskedastic) t-statistics are reported in parentheses.   
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Table 3: Financial Intermediary Development and Income Inequality in a Panel: Bank Assets. 
  Ordinary Least Squares  Generalized Method of Moments 
Dependent Variable  Gini Coefficient (Natural Log) 
Number of Observations  170 170 170 170 170 170 
Number of Countries  44 44 44 44 44 44 
Financial Sector Development        
   Bank Assets  -0.0439*  -0.1402  -0.2557  -0.2418*** 0.6200  -1.0973* 
   (Natural Log, as share of GDP)  (-1.77) (-0.80) (-1.19) (-3.55) (0.35) (-1.66) 
   Squared Bank Assets    0.0140      -0.1162   
   (Square of Natural Log, share of GDP)    (0.54)    (-0.49)  
   Modern Sector* Bank Assets      0.0024      0.0092 
      (Interaction  Term)     (0.99)    (1.26) 
Initial GDP        
   Initial GDP per Capita  0.8074***  0.8338***  0.8870***  0.7179*** 0.5557  0.7498** 
      (Natural  Log)  (4.07) (4.08) (4.13) (3.11) (1.29) (2.23) 
   Initial GDP per Capita Squared  -0.0557*** -0.0574*** -0.0612*** -0.0500*** -0.0395 -0.0528** 
   (Square of Natural Log)  (-4.49)  (-4.47)  (-4.47)  (-3.51)  (-1.44)  (-2.47) 
Other Controls        
   Risk of Expropriation  -0.0199  -0.0204  -0.0223*  0.0008  -0.0013  -0.0084 
   (Index – higher values mean lower risk)  (-1.64)  (-1.64)  (-1.85)  (0.05)  (-0.08)  (-0.52) 
   Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization  0.1088  0.1119  0.1133  0.1411  0.1087  0.1778** 
   (Higher values mean greater fractionalization)  (1.41)  (1.43)  (1.50)  (1.60)  (0.94)  (2.04) 
      Government  Consumption  -0.1020**  -0.0886 -0.0839 -0.0662 -0.1891 -0.0334 
   (Natural Log, Share of GDP)  (-2.08) (-1.53) (-1.59) (-1.14) (-0.71) (-0.40) 
   Inflation   0.1571*  0.1518  0.1451  -0.0718  0.0500  -0.1367 
   (Natural Log)  (1.74)  (1.62)  (1.54)  (-0.47)  (0.20)  (-0.77) 
   Modern Sector (Services and Industry)  0.0053*  0.0050  -0.0020  0.0094**  0.0105**  -0.0165 
   (Share of GDP)  (1.73)  (1.61)  (-0.24)  (2.37)  (2.24)  (-0.66) 
      Constant  0.8694 0.9229 1.2016 1.3227 0.6339  3.6491*** 
  (1.21) (1.30) (1.54) (1.54) (0.41) (2.82) 
R-Squared  0.56  0.56  0.56     
Hansen’s J-Test (Significance Level)      0.81  0.72  0.71 
 ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. 
The instruments for GMM specifications are dummies indicating legal origin.  The null hypothesis of the Hansen test is that the instruments are 
not correlated with the error terms. White (heteroskedastic) t-statistics are reported in parentheses.   